IV. Back to History's Default Settings
Every age develops a theory about itself. Most people never articulate that theory explicitly, but it shapes their expectations, influences their decisions, and defines the limits of what they believe is possible. As this theory becomes more deeply embedded, it begins to shape not only how people interpret the present, but also how they imagine the future. Conditions that persist for long enough cease to appear contingent and instead come to seem inevitable. The patterns of the present are projected forward, temporary circumstances are mistaken for enduring trends, and historical exceptions come to be viewed as rules. It is precisely in these moments, when assumptions and theories become most deeply embedded and least likely to be questioned, that societies become vulnerable to surprise.
The extraordinary stability of the post-1991 world encouraged the belief that the major forces which had shaped previous centuries were losing their relevance. Economic integration appeared to be replacing geopolitical rivalry, global markets seemed more important than national borders and military power increasingly appeared secondary to finance, technology, and trade.
These beliefs did not emerge from ignorance, but from success. The post-Cold War era was, by many measures, one of the most successful periods in modern history. International trade expanded dramatically and technological innovation transformed societies at an extraordinary pace. Furthermore, hundreds of millions of people escaped poverty and large portions of the world experienced a degree of prosperity and stability that would have seemed astonishing to previous generations.
The problem was not that the West misunderstood the present, but that it misunderstood the nature of it. The conditions that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union were treated as the beginning of a permanent historical trajectory rather than as the product of a particular geopolitical moment. The unprecedented concentration of Western power that characterized the 1990s and early 2000s quietly faded into the background of public consciousness. Because the order appeared stable, many forgot to ask what had made it stable and because competition seemed absent, many assumed it had just disappeared.
Winston Churchill, a figure I greatly admire, famously said that the farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. Throughout the centuries, states have competed for power, security, influence and resources, and the natural norm was that economic relationships exist alongside strategic rivalry rather than replacing it. Through time, the actors change, the technologies change and the institutions change, but the underlying dynamics always display persistence. Nations continue to pursue their interests. Power continues to matter. Geography continues to matter. Industrial capacity continues to matter.
The central argument of this essay is not that history has suddenly returned. In an important sense, history never left. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, the reemergence of industrial policy, and the growing emphasis on resilience are not evidence that the world has become abnormal, but that the world is behaving as it normally has throughout most of the recorded history. What was actually unusual was the brief period during which many believed these forces had become less important than they truly were.
The post-Cold War era should therefore be understood not as the destination of history but as an exception within it. It was a period during which a unique distribution of power created conditions that appeared both stable and self-sustaining. The United States faced no peer competitor, and the Western alliance remained economically and militarily dominant. Globalization expanded under the protection of an order that few seriously challenged, and these conditions encouraged a generation to believe that the future would largely resemble the present. The age of complacency emerged not because the Western societies became weak, but because they adapted themselves to a world that appeared unusually secure.
But that world is changing. The strategic environment of the twenty-first century increasingly resembles the historical norm rather than the historical exception. Competition between major powers is returning, industrial capacity is once again being viewed strategically and governments are rediscovering the importance of supply chains, energy security, critical technologies, and manufacturing resilience. The assumptions that defined the post-Cold War era are finally being tested by realities they were never designed to confront.
Whether the West succeeds in adapting to this new environment remains largely an open question and the answer will depend upon decisions made over the next decade. The years we experienced for the last three decades were not the end of history, but a pause in a much older story. The task facing the West today is not to preserve that pause indefinitely, but to understand what comes after it. Only by recognizing the exceptional nature of the world we inherited can allow us to begin preparing for the world that is emerging in its place.